Trust in Me: Allegiance Choices in a Post Split Terrorist Movement by Morrison, J. & Morrison, J.
Trust	in	Me		
1	
	
Title:	Trust	in	Me:	Allegiance	Choices	in	a	Post	Split	Terrorist	Movement	
	
Keywords:	Trust;	Splits;	Northern	Ireland;	IRA;	Terrorism;	Allegiance	
	
Author:	Dr.	John	F.	Morrison,	PhD,	University	of	East	London	
	
Abstract:	This	paper	analyses	exploratory	research	into	how	individual	members	
form	allegiances	in	the	aftermath	of	a	split	in	a	terrorist	movement,	specifically	
the	Irish	Republican	Movement.	While	the	allegiance	decision	making	is	not	a	
violent	act	in	itself	the	decisions	made	often	times	constitute	a	choice	between	
the	retention	of	terrorism	as	a	dominant	tactic	and	the	move	towards	a	peaceful,	
political	solution.	It	may	be	intuitive	to	believe	that	individuals	will	make	such	
decisions	based	on	the	reasoning	for	the	divide	or	the	ideology	for	the	groups.	
However,	through	the	analysis	of	over	forty	interviews	with	leadership	and	rank	
and	file	members	of	the	Irish	Republican	Movement	the	issue	of	personal	trust	is	
shown	to	be	central	to	the	decision‐making	process,	especially	in	relation	to	the	
rank	and	file	membership.	This	finding	is	concluded	through	the	application	of	
interpretative	phenomenological	analysis	of	four	core	splits	in	Irish	
Republicanism	from	1969	to	1997.		
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“It	was	not	clear‐cut	hard	political	people	deciding.	It	was	human	factors	
that	was	deciding	why	some	people	went	with	one	side	over	another.”	
(Interview	with	Mick	Ryan,	March	24,	2009)	
1.1	Introduction	
Trust	is	a	concept	familiar	and	integral	to	all.	As	individuals,	but	also	as	a	society,	
we	go	through	our	everyday	lives	consciously	and	unconsciously	trusting	a	
variety	of	people,	organisations,	systems	and	entities	to	carry	out	their	
designated	functions.	As	no	one	is	fully	self‐sufficient	everyone	requires	trust	in	
others	(Bluhm,	1987).	From	commuting	to	work	to	banking,	eating	out	to	posting	
a	letter	we	place	our	trust	in	a	range	of	people.	However,	when	this	trust	
dissipates	so	too	does	the	effectiveness	of	the	social	structures	supporting	our	
society.	Recent‐times	have	seen	a	variety	of	social	movements	and	protests	arise	
due	to	a	significant	decline	in	the	trust	of	institutions,	individuals	or	principles.	
From	the	Arab	Spring	to	Occupy	Wall	Street,	the	Ferguson	protests	to	the	London	
riots	one	of	the	central	themes	present	was	distrust;	distrust	in	the	political	elite,	
financial	institutions,	the	police	or	the	judicial	system.		
	
While	it	is	clear	that	trust	is	a	vital	component	in	our	everyday	decision‐making	
the	present	article	aims	to	analyse	the	role	that	it	plays	in	the	decision‐making	
process	of	members	of	terrorist	groups,	and	specifically	allegiance	decision‐
making	within	terrorist	movements.	This	exploratory	research	is	based	on	
interviews	with	43	rank	and	file	and	leadership	members	of	the	Irish	Republican	
Movement,	and	analyses	the	role	which	trust	played	in	their	allegiance	decisions	
in	the	lead‐up	to	and	aftermath	of	an	organisational	split.	The	research	focuses	
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on	4	splits	in	the	movement;	1969/70,	1974,	1986	and	1997.	These	four	splits	
saw	the	birth	of	some	of	the	most	dangerous	paramilitary	groups	in	Ireland	and	
Britain’s	history,	the	Official	IRA,	Provisional	IRA,	INLA,	Continuity	IRA	and	Real	
IRA	(See	Morrison,	2014).	
	
Throughout	this	article	there	is	continuous	reference	to	terrorism,	terrorists	and	
terrorist	groups.	Each	of	these	terms	is	contentious	in	their	own	right,	and	has	
justified	chapters,	article	and	books	to	debate	their	true	meaning.	The	aim	of	this	
article	is	not	to	enter	into	this	debate.	However,	it	is	recognised	that	it	is	
necessary	to	define	these	first	order	principles.	Therefore	for	the	purpose	of	this	
article	terrorism	is	defined	as	the	employment	of	violence,	or	the	threat	of	
violence,	to	bring	about	political	effect.	The	aim	of	this	action	is	to	bring	about	a	
state	of	fear	in	a	wider	audience	than	the	direct	physical	victims	of	the	initial	act	
or	threat	of	violence.	A	terrorist	incident	should	be	defined	by	the	use	of,	or	
threat	of,	violence	to	bring	about	political	effect.	Therefore	terrorism	is	a	tactic	
that	can	be	employed	by	any	individual	or	group,	whether	they	are	state	or	non‐
state	actors.	However,	in	order	to	be	defined	as	a	terrorist	or	a	terrorist	group	
the	utility	of	terrorism	must	be	one	of	the	dominant	tactics	used	in	order	to	
achieve	ones	aims.	Therefore	not	everyone	or	every	group	who	has	utilised	
terrorism	once	should	automatically	be	classified	as	a	terrorist	or	as	a	terrorist	
group.	
	
In	order	to	understand	and	appreciate	terrorist	groups,	their	strategies,	tactics	
and	evolution	we	must	be	able	to	analyse	their	decision‐making	processes	and	
what	influences	them.	McCormick	posited	that	there	are	three	theoretical	
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strands	that	can	assist	us	in	understanding	terrorist	decision‐making;	strategic,	
organisational	and	psychological	theories	(McCormick,	2003).	Building	on	this	
the	present	article	analyses	decision‐making	from	a	psychological	point	of	view.	
Shapiro	rightly	notes	that	any	interpretation	and	analysis	of	decision‐making	
requires	a	detailed	knowledge	of	the	people	involved	and	their	roles	within	the	
group	(Shapiro,	2012).	It	is	clear	that	this	respect	for	role‐specific	heterogeneity	
is	essential	if	we	are	to	advance	our	understanding	of	terrorist	actors	and	
decisions	they	make	(Gill	and	Young,	2011).	Within	terrorist	groups,	as	with	all	
other	human	organisations,	individual	actors	have	different	levels	of	experience,	
knowledge,	influence	and	skills	as	well	as	different	duties	within	the	
organisation.	Similarly	the	decisions	they	make	are	heterogeneous.	These	
heterogeneities	must	be	respected	more	within	our	research.	It	is	out	of	respect	
for	this	that	the	analysis	hosted	within	this	article	differentiates	between	the	
individual	actors	interviewed.	It	emphasises	the	importance	of	assessing	the	
decision‐making	of	leadership	and	rank	and	file	members	separately.	
	
While	McCormick	(2003)	and	many	others	understandably	focus	on	the	
decisions	that	lead	to	terrorist	events	it	is	also	essential	that	in	order	to	gain	the	
full	understanding	of	what	it	means	to	be	involved	in	a	terrorist	group	that	we	
must	also	analyse	those	decisions	that	are	not	directly	related	to	a	violent	act.	
Throughout	the	lifetime	of	a	terrorist	group,	and	the	careers	of	its	individual	
members,	the	acts	of	violence	and	the	decisions	leading	to	them	only	represent	
the	sporadic	peaks	of	activity.	While	it	is	clear	that	we	need	to	understand	these	
peaks	of	violence	it	is	when	we	also	understand	the	troughs	of	non‐violence	that	
we	will	be	able	to	fully	understand	what	it	means	to	be	involved	in	a	terrorist	
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group	(Morrison,	2013).	The	present	article	focuses	on	one	of	these	‘troughs’,	the	
organisational	split.	Specifically	it	assesses	how	and	why	people	decide	their	
organisational	allegiances	in	a	post‐split	environment,	and	questions	what	role	if	
any	trust	plays	in	these	decisions.	For	some	reading	this	the	area	of	
organisational	split,	and	more	specifically	post‐split	allegiance	decision‐making,	
may	seem	like	only	a	small	sliver	of	the	terrorist	experience.	This	may	be	so.	
However,	it	is	only	when	we	truly	understand	each	of	these	small	slivers,	and	
their	relevance	that	we	can	even	come	close	to	fully	understanding	what	it	
means	to	be	involved	in	a	terrorist	organisation.	As	will	be	shown	throughout	the	
article	it	is	often	times	these	non‐violent	decisions	that	lead	an	actor	to	the	
persistent	utility	of	violence.	
	
Up	until	recently	the	academic	community	has	largely	ignored	organisational	
splits	in	terrorist	and	insurgent	groups.	However,	recent	times	has	seen	a	
modest	growth	in	the	analysis	of	the	issue.	Over	the	past	few	years	it	has	been	
shown	that	a	competing	leadership	structure,	alongside	the	employment	of	
tactical	violence	can	expedite	the	splintering	of	an	organisation	(Asal,	Brown	and	
Dalton,	2012).	It	has	also	been	demonstrated	that	splits	can	be	an	integral	part	of	
the	politicisation	of	an	erstwhile	violent	group	(Morrison,	2014)	and	we	now	
know	that	the	length	of	civil	wars	are	not	necessarily	extended	as	a	result	of	
organisational	fragmentation	(Findley	and	Rudloff,	2012).	As	can	be	observed	
from	these	stated	examples,	and	across	the	broader	literature,	the	majority	of	
splits	analysis	focuses	on	the	organisational	and	conflict	related	factors	leading	
to	and	resulting	from	division.	However,	by	examining	individual	decision‐
making	the	present	article	moves	beyond	the	more	common	organisational	
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assessment.	It	aims	to	assess	what	influences	an	individual’s	allegiance	choices.	
In	doing	so	it	attempts	to	come	closer	to	understanding	why	the	resultant	parent	
and	dissident	factions	emerge	and	how	their	overall	levels	of	membership	will	be	
decided.		
	
This	article	is	therefore	more	in	line	with	Ethan	Bueno	de	Mesquita’s	(2008)	
article	‘Terrorist	Factions’.	In	this	article	Bueno	de	Mesquita	develops	a	model	to	
ascertain	what	factors	may	affect	terrorist	mobilisation	and	the	likelihood	of	a	
splinter	faction	developing.	However,	in	order	to	inform	this	organisational	
analysis	Bueno	de	Mesquita	also	questioned	why	members	of	a	continuum	of	
potential	terrorists	would	align	themselves	with	one	side	over	the	other.	In	doing	
so	he	rightly	states	that	the	allegiance	decision‐making	can	be	made	as	a	result	of	
ideological	and/or	non‐ideological	factors.	Referencing	Stern	(2003)	he	states	
that	these	non‐ideological	factors	may	include	the	charisma	of	the	leader	and	the	
level	of	private	goods	the	faction	can	afford	to	provide.	However,	as	has	been	
previously	stated	the	present	article	assesses	a	previously	under‐researched	
non‐ideological	factor	bypassed	by	Bueno	de	Mesquita	and	others,	the	factor	of	
trust.	While	the	aim	of	both	this	article	and	Bueno	de	Mesquita’s	may	seem	
similar,	namely	assessing	why	people	will	choose	one	side	over	the	other,	the	
approaches	to	answering	this	question	are	starkly	different.	While	Bueno	de	
Mesquita	utilises	algorithmic	modelling	the	present	article	analyses	data	
gathered	through	an	extensive	interview	process.	These	should	not	be	seen	to	be	
in	competition	with	each	other.	On	the	contrary	these,	and	other	future	research	
on	the	area,	should	be	regarded	as	complimentary	and	developing	our	
knowledge	of	the	topic.	
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Terrorist	groups	the	world	over	have	defined,	and	legitimised,	their	existence	
based	on	their	ideological	and	strategic	foundations.	It	can	therefore	be	at	times	
intuitive	to	presume,	and	easy	to	find	evidence	to	support,	that	individual	
members	and	supporters	join,	align	and	stay	with	the	groups	based	on	these	
same	ideological	beliefs	and	strategies.	Bin	Hassan	(2006)	claims	that	it	is	
ideology	that	drives	and	motivates	terrorists.	Orsini	(2012)	in	his	research	on	
the	Italian	Red	Brigades	cautions	against	making	group	wide	generalisations,	yet	
goes	on	to	claim	that	all	of	the	murders	carried	out	by	the	Red	Brigades	draws	
one’s	attention	to	the	causal	power	of	ideology.	However,	as	is	acknowledged	by	
each	of	Bin	Hassan	(2006),	Bueno	de	Mesquita	(2008)	and	Orsini	(2012)	
ideological	commitment	on	its	own	is	insufficient	to	explain	why	an	individual	
may	become	involved,	and	stay	involved,	with	a	terrorist	group.	Taylor	and	
Horgan	outline	that	irrespective	of	ideology,	politics	or	social	processes	that	
engagement	in	terrorist	behaviour	essentially	involves	an	individual	having	and	
taking	an	opportunity	to	partake	in	terrorist	behaviour	(Taylor	and	Horgan,	
2006).	Developing	on	this	in	order	to	align	with,	and	join,	a	specific	terrorist	
organisation	irrespective	of	one’s	ideological	beliefs	and	strategic	support	for	the	
utility	of	violence,	one	must	also	have	an	opportunity.	By	accepting	this	we	must	
then	ask	‘what	creates	this	opportunity?’	While	there	are	a	variety	of	factors	
which	may	bring	it	about	the	present	article	will	focus	on	one	of	the	most	under	
researched.	That	factor	is	trust.		
1.2 Trust 
But	what	is	trust?	Diego	Gambetta	(2000,	p.218)	states	that:	
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“…(t)rust	(or,	symmetrically,	distrust)	is	a	particular	level	of	the	subjective	
probability	with	which	an	agent	assesses	that	another	agent	or	group	of	agents	
will	perform	a	particular	action,	both	before	he	can	monitor	such	action	(or	
independently	of	his	capacity	ever	to	be	able	to	monitor	it)	and	in	a	context	in	
which	it	affects	his	own	action.”		
	
This	level	of	‘subjective	probability’	relies	on	an	individual’s	belief	that	another	
agent	not	only	has	the	ability,	but	also	the	intention,	to	perform	an	action	
expected.	This	action	can	be	continuous	or	a	once	off.	If	evidence	transpires	in	
relation	to	their	inability	or	lack	of	intent	trust	will	need	to	be	re‐evaluated.	
Whether	this	is	an	evaluation	of	an	individual,	institution	or	principle	relates	to	
the	form	of	trust	under	review.	
	
Seligman	(1997)	believes	that	there	are	three	varieties	of	trust;	abstract,	
functional	and	personal.	Abstract	trust	refers	to	the	relationship	between	an	
individual	or	group	and	a	system	or	principle.	One	of	the	key	examples	in	this	
regard	is	a	population’s	trust	in	the	principle	of	democracy,	and	by	contrast	the	
distrust	of	autocracy.	Functional	trust	relates	to	a	practical	relationship	between	
individuals.	For	example	a	restaurant’s	patron	has	a	functional	trust	in	the	
waiters	to	pass	on	the	correct	information	and	trust	in	chefs	to	cook	the	food	
appropriately.	The	final	form	of	trust	described	by	Seligman	(1997)	is	personal	
trust.	This	is	a	form	of	trust	that	exceeds	any	functionality	and	concerns	the	
nature	and	quality	of	personal	relationships	between	individuals.	This	is	similar	
to	moralistic	trust	(Rathbun,	2009),	which	is	trust	based	on	the	assessment	of	an	
individual’s	inherent	dependability	due	to	their	veracity	and	character.	Rathbun	
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(2009)	has	also	developed	the	notion	of	‘generalised	trust’	by	which	he	refers	to	
trust	that	is	linked	not	to	the	individual	trustee,	but	to	their	societal	norms	and	
the	belief	that	they	will	conform	to	them.		
	
In	her	analysis	of	terrorism	and	trust	in	Northern	Ireland	Fierke	(2009)	
illustrates	how	the	majority	of	the	literature	in	relation	to	terrorism	and	trust	is	
concerned	with	the	question	of	‘whether	terrorism	increases	in‐group	trust	or	
leads	to	a	shattering	of	distrust’.	By	applying	this	central	question	to	The	
Troubles	Fierke	(2009)	outlines	how	the	case	of	Bloody	Sunday	in	1972	led	to	an	
automatic	distrust	in	the	British	government	and	the	security	services,	not	just	
because	of	the	resultant	casualties,	but	also	as	a	result	of	the	related	cover‐up	in	
the	years	after.	This	in	turn	was	shown	to	strengthen	the	trust	in	the	
disenfranchised	nationalist	communities,	and	those	choosing	to	represent	them.	
Resultantly	in	the	aftermath	of	Bloody	Sunday	the	Provisional	IRA	saw	a	
significant	surge	in	recruitment	(Gill	and	Horgan,	2013,	p.	437).	In	contrast	to	
this	growing	distrust	in	the	state	Fierke	outlines	that	attacks	by	the	non‐state	
terrorist	actors	can	in	turn	consolidate	trust	in	the	government,	including	the	
figureheads	of	national	leadership.	An	example	of	this	can	be	most	clearly	seen	in	
the	sudden	rise	from	51%	to	a	high	of	90%	in	the	approval	ratings	of	President	
George	W.	Bush	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	9/11	(Gallup,	2001).	Without	yet	
doing	anything	significant	in	response	to	the	attacks	support	for,	and	trust	in,	
Bush	had	dramatically	risen.	
	
Hosking	agrees	that	there	can	be	a	rise	in	the	trust	of	the	democratic	institutions	
in	the	aftermath	of	a	non‐state	terrorist	attack	(Hosking,	2009).	However,	he	also	
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points	out	that	the	threat	of	further	attacks	can	result	in	an	increased	distrust	of	
those	around	you,	the	broader	community	in	which	you	are	living.	People	can	
become	paranoid,	constantly	wondering	if	nearby	is	the	next	terrorist.	In	a	post	
9/11	world	this	has	seen	the	rise	in	influence	of	a	number	of	groups	and	
individuals	with	anti‐Muslim	policies,	rhetoric	and	beliefs	playing	a	pivotal	role	
in	their	emergence,	existence	and	popularity.	This	is	central	to	the	aim	of	
terrorism,	to	induce	fear	and	distrust	in	a	wider	community	than	those	directly	
and	physically	affected	by	the	attack(s).	At	its	most	acute	this	fear‐induced	
distrust	can	significantly	disrupt	our	everyday	life	(Hosking,	2009,	p.	482).	
	
While	these	forms	of	organisational	and	communal	trust	and	distrust	clearly	
need	to	be	analysed	further,	so	too	does	the	role	of	personal	trust	internally	in	
the	terrorist	groups.	Within	this	analysis	the	internal	influence	of	trust	can	be	
more	readily	assessed.	In	turn	it	can	broaden	our	true	understanding	of	the	
influence	which	trust	has	both	internally	within	the	groups,	as	well	as	external	
from	them.	This	can	also	broaden	the	scope	of	our	research	away	from	solely	
looking	at	trust’s	relationship	with	acts	of	terrorism.	It	can	incorporate	non‐
violent	actions	and	decision‐making	as	well.		
	
In	their	analysis	of	terrorist	recruitment	both	Hegghammer	(2013)	and	
Vertigans	(2011)	both	argue	that	personal	trust	plays	a	key	role.	Hegghammer	
(2013)	puts	forward	the	hypothesis	that	within	the	recruitment	process	the	
recruiter	and	the	potential	recruit	are	involved	in	a	‘trust	game.’	He	postulates	
that	during	this	process	the	recruiter	is	assessing	the	trustworthiness	of	each	
potential	new	recruit.	Within	this	trust	game	it	is	essential	not	only	that	the	new	
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recruit	is	ideologically	committed	but	that	they	also	pose	the	lowest	form	of	risk	
to	the	security	of	the	existing	network,	while	at	the	same	time	bringing	the	
highest	potential	reward	to	the	organisation.	This	is	supported	by	Vertigans	
(2011)	who	says	that	the	minimisation	of	risk	and	maximisation	of	effectiveness	
is	reliant	on	the	power	of	secrecy	and	trust.	By	drawing	on	the	concepts	of	‘thick’	
and	‘thin’	trust	(Putnam,	2000)	Vertigans	(2011)	argues	that	terrorist	groups	
need	to	generate	trust	both	within	the	group	and	across	members.	New	recruits	
to	the	group	require	evidence	that	they	can	trust	the	group	they	are	putting	
themselves	in	danger	to	join.	Likewise	existing	members	need	to	be	confident	in	
abilities,	morality	and	temperament	of	the	new	recruit	(Ibid,	p.97).	This	trust	
must	be	a	‘thick	trust’	emphasised	by	strong	interpersonal	ties,	rather	than	a	
‘thin	trust’	of	weak	ties	(Putnam,	2000).								
	
To	date,	outside	of	the	examples	already	cited,	there	has	been	little	research	
carried	out	in	this	form	of	trust‐based	analysis	in	relation	to	terrorism	studies.	
However,	we	do	not	need	to	rely	solely	on	research	that	has	been	carried	out	in	
regards	to	terrorist	actors.	In	order	to	gain	a	broader	understanding	we	need	to	
look	beyond	political	violence.	There	is	much	to	be	gained	by	also	analysing	non‐
political	criminality	as	well	as	social	movements.		
	
The	history	of	research	has	continuously	shown	the	power	that	trust	and	
familiarity	have	played	in	the	initial	engagement	within	a	social	movement.	
Whether	one	is	looking	at	entrance	into	religious	communities	(Snow,	Zurcher	
and	Ekland‐Olson,	1980)	or	secular	movements	(Diani	and	Lodi,	1988)	the	
research	demonstrates	that	the	vast	majority	of	individual	members	were	
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recruited	through	personal	contacts.	When	the	social	movement	being	entered	
comes	with	a	greater	degree	of	risk	or	danger,	stronger	and	more	numerous	ties	
to	the	movement	are	required	(Della	Porta	and	Diani,	2006).	This	has	been	
shown	in	relation	to	involvement	in	African‐American	civil	rights	movements	
(McAdam,	1986)	and	Italian	left‐wing	groups	(Della	Porta,	1988)	amongst	
others.	While	starkly	different	in	a	number	of	ways	the	danger	associated	with	
membership	of	these	organisations	can	be	seen	as	analogous	to	the	risks	
associated	membership	of	a	terrorist	group.	These	heightened	risks	of	
membership	necessitate	heightened	degrees	of	trust	for	involvement.	The	social	
connections	formed,	and	the	experience	gained	from	previous	affiliations	and	
activities	can	in	turn	heighten	the	levels	of	trust	displayed	towards	a	potential	
new	recruit	by	the	existing	membership.	The	role	that	trust	plays	in	the	
recruitment	process	can	be	similarly	seen	when	one	analyses	non‐political	
criminality.	
	
Von	Lampe	and	Johansen	(2004)	outline	how	there	are	two	key	perspectives	
from	which	the	relationship	between	organised	crime	and	trust	are	analysed.	
The	first	relates	to	co‐operation,	with	the	second	referring	to	acceptance.	In	
essence	these	ask	some	ostensibly	simple,	yet	vital,	questions.	Why	do	people	
take	part	in	illegal	activity	together?	And	why	are	specific	others	accepted	into	
the	organisation?	These	questions	are	the	bedrock	of	all	organised	illegal	
activity,	and	are	similar	to	the	questions	raised	by	Hegghammer	(2013)	and	
Vertigans	(2011)	in	relation	to	terrorism	and	trust.	Without	acceptance	and	co‐
operation	organised	criminal	groups	can	neither	survive	nor	thrive.	Across	the	
literature	on	trust	in	criminal	groups	the	significance	of	kinship	is	consistently	
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emphasised	in	the	discussion	of	co‐operation,	whether	in	reference	to	its	
somewhat	obvious	relationship	with	the	Sicilian	Mafia	(Campana	and	Varese,	
2012)	or	in	drug	dealing	groups	(Pearson	and	Hobbs,	1999;	Denton	and	
O’Malleu,	1999).	In	a	clandestine	world	where	the	trust	building	safeguards	of	
the	courts	and	legal	system	are	not	a	viable	option	to	protect	your	interests	trust	
in	family	can	act	as	a	replacement	‘safety	net.’	By	developing	criminal	
organisations	across	family	lines	Mafiosi	have	increased	compliance	in	the	
organisation	as	well	as	deterring	any	future	defections	(Campana	and	Varese,	
2012).	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	by	either	defecting	or	failing	to	comply	
members	are	potentially	putting	their	own	family	and	community	at	risk	of	any	
resultant	legal	intervention.	The	value	of	kinship	is	reflective	of	Shapiro’s	(2013)	
observations	in	relation	to	both	Al	Qaeda	and	Jemaah	Islamiyah.	He	notes	that	
within	both	groups	members	are	encouraged	to	marry	fellow	affiliates.	As	with	
the	organised	crime	groups	those	involved	in	‘intermarriages’	face	a	larger	cost	if	
they	are	either	caught	acting	against	the	wishes	of	the	leadership	or	if	they	are	
prosecuted	for	membership,	or	terrorism	related	crimes.	
	
In	order	for	criminal	organisations	to	expand	there	needs	to	be	a	broader	
recruitment	strategy	than	one	based	on	kinship.	It	has	been	found	that	when	this	
is	the	case	that	the	violence	is	used	to	assure	the	organisation	can	trust	an	
individual,	and	can	therefore	both	accept	and	co‐operate	with	them.	Schelling	
(1963)	notes	that	by	partaking	in	a	violent	action	during	their	early	membership	
a	new	member	is	by	deed	giving	a	promise	of	commitment	to	the	group.	Through	
their	act	of	violence	the	group	is	gaining	currency	that	they	can	use	against	them	
if	there	is	ever	a	future	threat	of	defection	or	failure	to	comply.	However,	the	new	
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recruit	is	also	demonstrating	their	willingness	to	contribute	to	the	group’s	
activities,	and	can	therefore	be	trusted.	A	similar	occurrence	has	been	also	
observed	within	terrorist	groups.	Silke	(1999)	noted	how	some	former	prisoners	
returning	to	the	Provisional	IRA	during	the	Troubles	carried	out	acts	of	violent	
vigilantism	to	redeem	their	reputation	if	their	behaviour	while	in	custody	was	
called	into	question.	This	role	was	also	used	by	new	recruits	to	cement	their	
trustworthiness	and	ability	to	partake	in	more	high‐level	activities,	activities	
which	required	a	higher	degree	of	trust.	As	with	the	organised	crime	groups	the	
information	about	these	actions	could	be	used	against	the	new	recruits	if	they	
posed	a	potential	future	threat	against	the	group.		
	
If	one	is	to	adhere	to	Gambetta’s	definition	of	trust	in	that	it	‘is	a	particular	level	
of	the	subjective	probability	with	which	an	agent	assesses	that	another	agent	or	
group	of	agents	will	perform	a	particular	action’	(Gambetta,	2000,	p.218)	then	
these	actions	noted	by	Silke	(1999)	and	Schelling	(1963)	fit	within	the	
operationalization	of	trust.	However,	it	is	posited	here	that	these	forms	of	
predictable	activity	are	less	explained	by	the	inherent	trust	between	two	
individuals,	or	one	individual	and	a	group.	In	contrast	this	is	better	explained	
through	the	notion	of	coerced	compliance,	in	that	through	their	previous	illegal	
activities	within	the	group	or	relationship	with	other	members	of	the	group	that	
they	are	forced	to	comply	with	the	wishes	of	the	leadership	and	the	entire	
organisation.		
	
What	has	been	detailed	in	much	of	the	criminal	trust	literature	relates	to	how	the	
senior	membership	can	trust	new	recruits	enough	to	allow	them	into	an	
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organisation,	or	assist	in	their	participation	in	illegal	activity.	As	was	noted	by	
Moselli,	Gigeure	and	Petit	(2007)	trust	in	criminal	networks	emerges	most	
clearly	when	it	is	time	to	execute	a	crime.	However,	the	present	research	
reverses	these	questions	and	assertions.	It	is	not	only	looking	at	the	trust	which	
the	leadership	may	have	in	potential	recruits	but	is	also	analysing	the	trust	
which	potential	recruits	may	have	in	the	organisation	they	are	joining.	Similarly	
it	is	not	looking	at	the	role	of	trust	within	the	execution	of	crime	but	is	
questioning	the	role	which	trust	may	have	in	relation	to	the	starting	point	of	
allegiance	decisions.	By	assessing	the	role	of	trust	in	relation	to	terrorist	group	
allegiance	the	research	is	questioning	whether	those	aligning	with	the	groups	
make	this	decision	as	a	result	of	ideological	beliefs	and/or	their	desire	to	partake	
in	terrorist	or	paramilitary	activity.	
1.3	Methodology	
This	exploratory	research	is	based	on	a	series	of	interviews	carried	out	with	
members	of	the	political	and	paramilitary	wings	of	the	Irish	Republican	
Movement.	These	took	place	between	2007	and	2013.	The	sample	is	a	purposive	
sample.	Participants	were	selected	due	to	their	involvement	in	one	or	more	of	
the	four	selected	splits:	1969/70,	1974,	1986	and	1997.	The	interviews	were	
part	of	a	wider	project	looking	at	the	organisational	and	individual	
characteristics	of	splits.		
	
In	total	43	participants	were	interviewed,	8	on	more	than	one	occasion.	Of	these	
5	were	female	and	38	were	male.	The	ages,	education,	employment,	marital	
status	and	other	demographics	of	the	participants	were	not	recorded	either	in	
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relation	to	the	time	of	the	split,	or	at	the	time	of	the	interview.	Two	interviewees	
requested	for	their	interviews	not	to	be	recorded,	during	these	two	meetings	
detailed	notes	were	taken	and	written	up	immediately	afterwards.	These	were	
checked	and	verified	with	the	participants.	Each	of	the	other	interviews	were	
recorded	and	transcribed	verbatim.		
	
Where	possible	individuals	in	both	the	national	leadership	and	the	wider	
membership	were	interviewed.	The	ranking	of	the	individuals,	as	well	as	their	
allegiances,	was	fluid	rather	than	static	across	the	four	splits	analysed.	This	
information	is	illustrated	in	Tables	1‐4	below.	These	demographics	only	refer	to	
those	who	were	involved	in	the	actual	splits	themselves.	Other	participants	also	
commented	on	the	divisions	from	their	external	perspective.		
	
Contacts	were	made	through	a	variety	of	means,	including	correspondence	with	
the	political	wings,	former	prisoner	groups	and	independent	republican	
organisations.	Requests	were	made	to	speak	to	specific	individuals	and	to	
general	members	previously	involved	in	splits.	Trusted	intermediaries,	both	
internal	and	external	to	the	movement,	proved	an	especially	valuable	resource.	
Snowball	sampling	was	used	throughout	the	project.	At	the	end	of	the	interviews	
participants	were	asked	if	they	knew	of	anyone	else	with	relevant	experience	
that	might	be	willing	to	partake	in	the	research.	From	these	contacts	gained	
further	interviews	were	organised.			
Group	 Leadership	 Ordinary	
Member	
Involved	
Prior	to	the	
End	of	the	
Entered	
Republican	
Movement	
in	or	around	
1969/70	
Joined	
the	
group	
after	
initially	
Total
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Border	
Campaign	
joining	
the	other	
group	
Official	
Republican	
Movement	
3	 2	 4	 1	 10	
Provisional	
Republican	
Movement	
3	 3	 14	 3	 23	
Other	 1	 0	 0	 0	 1	
Total	 7	 5	 18	 4	 34	
Table	1:	Participants	involved	at	the	time	of	the	1969/70	split	
	
	
Group	 Leadership Ordinary	
Member	
Total
Official	Republican	Movement	 2	 4	 6	
Irish	Republican	Socialist	
Movement	
1	 4	 5	
Undisclosed	 0	 1	 1	
Total	 3	 9	 12	
		Table	2:	Participants	involved	at	the	time	of	the	1974	split	
	
Group	 Leadership Ordinary	
Membership	
Supporter	 Total
Provisional	
Republican	Movement	
8	 7	 0	 15	
Republican	Sinn	
Fein/Continuity	IRA	
6	 3	 2	 11	
Total	 14	 10	 2	 26	
Table	3:	Participants	involved	at	the	time	of	the	1986	split	
	
Group	 Leadership Ordinary	
Membership	
Total
Provisional	Republican	
Movement	
8	 1	 9	
32	County	Sovereignty	
Committee/	Real	IRA	
2	 1	 3	
Total	 10	 2	 12	
Table	4:	Participants	involved	at	the	time	of	the	1997	split.	
	
Only	four	rank	and	file	members	and	two	leadership	members	refused	to	take	
part	in	the	interview	process	when	appraoched.	It	is	believed	that	there	was	this	
positive	response	rate	due	to	the	fact	that	while	the	research	was	looking	at	
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illegal	organisations	it	was	not	looking	at	the	illegal	activity.	It	is	also	important	
to	note	that	the	majority	of	respondents	were	no	longer	involved	in	paramilitary	
activity.	While	this	was	not	validated	via	law	enforcement	this	assumption	was	
made	due	to	the	affiliation	of	many	with	the	Provisional	Republican	Movement	
who	were	on	permanent	ceasefire,	or	individuals’	stated	disengagement	from	
other	organisations.			
	
Participants	were	informed	that	any	discussion	of	open	or	live	cases,	or	the	
planning	of	any	future	illegal	activity	would	have	to	be	reported	to	the	police.	
Before	each	interview	participants	were	asked	to	give	their	informed	consent	
through	the	signing	of	a	consent	form.	At	the	end	of	the	interviews	each	
participant	was	asked	to	reaffirm	the	consent	for	their	interview	data	to	be	used.	
	
While	there	was	an	appreciation	of	the	importance	of	anonymity	participants	
were	given	the	opportunity	to	allow	their	name	to	be	used.	This	was	due	to	the	
fact	that	many	of	the	interviewees	are/were	public	figures,	and	the	topic	of	the	
splits	was	often	played	out	in	the	public	eye.	For	the	leaders	their	position	within	
the	movement	was	a	key	factor	to	be	considered	throughout	the	analysis.	
However,	for	those	participants	who	did	wish	their	identity	to	be	known	they	
were	given	aliases	and	the	identifiable	content	within	their	interview	data	was	
removed.	This	is	why	the	location	of	the	interviews	is	not	displayed	in	this	
article.	
	
Each	interview	was	conducted	in	a	semi‐structured	manner.	At	no	stage	were	
participants	asked	specifically	about	trust.	The	results	presented	in	this	article	
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relate	to	when	each	of	the	interviewees	described	the	rationale	behind	their	
allegiance	decision‐making.	Semi‐structured	interviewing	was	chosen,	as	it	was	
best	suited	to	the	analytical	technique	of	Interpretative	Phenomenological	
Analysis	(IPA),	a	variation	of	which	was	employed	to	analyse	the	interviews.		
	
IPA	is	a	qualitative	research	technique	originating	from	health	psychology	
(Holmes,	Coyle	and	Thomson,	1997).	More	recently	this	has	been	utilised	in	the	
analysis	of	accounts	of	terrorism	(See	for	example	Burgess,	Ferguson	and	
Hollywood,	2007;	Morrison,	2014).	The	purpose	of	IPA	is	to	gain	a	broad	insight	
into	an	individual’s	lived	experiences	and	their	own	personal	perception	of	an	
object	and/or	event.	It	is	not	the	aim	of	the	technique	to	gain	an	objective	record	
of	the	event	itself,	but	to	assess	what	people	believed	to	be	important	about	an	
issue.		It	is	therefore	appropriate	to	utilise	this	methodology	to	ascertain	why	
people	arrived	at	a	specific	decision.	
	
In	essence	IPA	is	broadly	concerned	with	how	people	think	and	what	they	
believe	to	be	important	and	relevant	about	the	issue	under	discussion	(Smith,	
Jarman	and	Osburn,	1999).	Throughout	the	interview	process	the	participant	is	
trying	to	make	sense	of	their	world	and	the	experiences	and	decisions	they	are	
being	asked	about.		Therefore	when	it	comes	to	the	interpretation	stages	of	the	
process	the	researcher	is	fundamentally	trying	to	make	sense	of	the	participants	
trying	to	make	sense	of	their	world.	It	is	not	pertinent	whether	or	not	these	
beliefs	contain	an	absolute	truth	of	the	situation,	what	is	important	is	that	the	
factors	or	themes	which	the	participants	deem	important	come	to	the	fore	in	the	
research.			
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Upon	completion	of	the	interviews	a	detailed	multi‐stage	interpretative	analysis	
of	the	data	was	conducted.	Within	each	stage	the	central	themes	arising	from	the	
analysis	were	documented.	These	were	then	further	analysed	with	constant	
reference	to	the	original	interview	transcripts.	As	the	process	progressed	across	
the	analytic	stages	themes	and	mechanisms	which	were	originally	broad	
evolved,	where	necessary,	to	become	more	refined	and	focused.	What	is	
presented	here	in	relation	to	trust	is	representative	of	one	of	the	over‐arching	
themes	concerning	post‐split	allegiance	decision‐making.		
1.4 Post‐Split Allegiance 
Throughout	it’s	history	militant	Irish	Republicanism	has	been	beset	by	
organisational	split.	The	30	years	of	the	Troubles	is	book‐ended	by	two	of	the	
most	significant	splits	of	all,	the	1969	emergence	of	the	Provisional	IRA	and	the	
1997	birth	of	the	Real	IRA.	Between	these	two	divisions	saw	the	1974	Official	
IRA	splintering	which	saw	the	emergence	of	the	Irish	National	Liberation	Army	
and	the	1986	split	in	the	Provisionals	which	was	the	starting	point	for	the	still	
active	Continuity	IRA.	Each	of	these	splits	originated	at	leadership	levels	before	
permeating	out	nationally	across	the	movement.	The	majority	ostensibly	
occurred	due	to	a	debate	over	the	level	of	political	and	armed	activity	for	the	
movement	to	partake	in	(see	Morrison,	2014	for	a	more	detailed	examination	of	
the	splits).	Therefore	one	would	intuitively	expect	that	with	clear	strategic	
defining	lines	between	both	sides	that	allegiance	choices	would	be	based	on	
these	differences.	But,	as	will	be	displayed	the	present	interview	data	challenges	
this	intuitive	assumption.	As	would	be	expected	the	leadership	allegiances	are	to	
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a	large	extent	defined	by	the	strategic	divide.	However,	this	is	not	reflected	when	
one	analyses	the	lower‐down	rank	and	file	data.	The	rank	and	file	affiliation	is	
critical	to	the	survival	of	these	groups.	In	terms	of	a	move	away	from	terrorist	
activity	it	is	clearly	important	to	have	a	leadership	who	advocate	a	refrain	from	
violence.	However,	what	is	more	important	is	that	they	can	bring	the	vast	
majority	of	the	organisation,	if	not	the	whole	membership,	away	from	terrorism	
too.	Without	the	rank	and	file	membership	also	denouncing	terrorism	the	
strategic	shift	has	no	effect,	and	can	ultimately	lead	to	the	advent	of	a	dissident	
organisation,	continuing	to	advocate	the	role	of	violence	in	order	to	achieve	their	
end	goal.	Ultimately	this	new	organisation	has	the	potential	to	emerge	more	
violent	than	their	predecessors	in	the	parent	group.	This	is	most	clearly	
illustrated	in	the	birth	of	the	PIRA	in	1969.	While	the	Cathal	Goulding	leadership	
of	the	erstwhile	IRA	were	advocating	politicisation	the	majority	combination	of	
new	recruits	and	existing	members	sided	with	the	emerging	Provisionals.	The	
PIRA	were	quickly	becoming	an	organisation	intent	on	heightening	armed	action,	
while	simultaneously	dismissing	the	power	of	politics.	
	
The	question	then	arises,	why	and	how	do	the	rank	and	file	members	align	
themselves	with	one	side	over	the	other	in	the	post‐split	environment.	While	
there	are	a	variety	of	factors,	including	the	strategic	reasoning	for	the	split,	the	
dominant	theme	across	the	rank	and	file	membership	interviewed	in	this	project	
is	the	dichotomous	theme	of	trust/distrust.	The	tipping‐point	for	the	majority	
came	when	they	assessed	how	those	individuals	they	trusted,	and	distrusted,	
were	aligning.	For	many	this	was	a	significantly	more	powerful	factor	than	any	
strategic	or	ideological	divide.	As	was	intimated	by	the	former	intelligence	officer	
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for	the	OIRA,	Mick	Ryan,	it	was	‘human	factors’	which	was	often	times	deciding	
people’s	allegiances.	
	
While	this	analysis	is	framed	as	post‐split	allegiance	decision‐making	in	reality	
the	decision	of	allegiance	is	made	at	difference	stages	of	the	process	of	split	
dependent	on	experience	levels	and	degrees	of	knowledge.	For	those	leadership	
figures	playing	a	central	role	in	the	split	their	allegiance	is	made	in	the	time	
leading	up	to	the	split.	This	could	be	in	the	preceding	months	or	even	years.	As	a	
rank	and	file	member	depending	on	one’s	closeness	to	the	leadership	the	
decisions	will	be	made	at	different	stages.	For	the	majority	of	the	organisation	
the	allegiance	decision	is	made	at	the	time	of,	or	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	
the	split.	However,	if	you	are	a	new	recruit	or	a	relatively	inexperienced	member	
it	may	take	a	significant	amount	of	time	for	your	awareness	of	any	divide	to	
emerge.	But	even	then	your	degree	of	knowledge	as	to	why	the	schism	has	
emerged	may	be	limited.		
1.4.1 Rank and File Membership 
The	emergence	of	the	PIRA	in	1969	coincided	with	an	upsurge	in	the	civil	rights	
movement	and	calls	for	greater	protection	of	the	nationalist	areas	in	Northern	
Ireland.	There	was	a	significant	sense	of	victimisation	within	the	nationalist	and	
republican	communities.	In	the	summer	of	1969	there	were	increasing	calls	for	
the	IRA	to	provide	protection	and	arms	for	the	Catholic	community.	In	light	of	
these	calls	there	was	a	surge	of	young	people	seeking	to	join	up	with	the	IRA	in	
1969	and	1970.	In	doing	so	they	inadvertently	first	had	to	make	an	allegiance	
choice.	Were	they	to	join	the	politicising	OIRA	or	the	emerging	paramilitary	force	
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of	the	PIRA?	For	the	majority	of	these	new	recruits	they	had	little	to	no	
knowledge	of	the	division	within	‘the	army,’	yet	in‐spite	of	this	they	still	made	
allegiance	decisions.	
	
“I	didn’t	really	understand	it	until	I	went	into	prison.	Then	I	started	learning	
things	about	why	the	split	occurred...”	(Interview	with	Joe	Doherty,	February	1st,	
2008)		
		
Their	initial	allegiance	choices	were	often	times	made	due	to	circumstance	and	
opportunity,	even	if	they	were	one	day	to	become	leading	members	of	the	
organisation.	Martin	McGuinness,	the	now	deputy	first	minister	of	Northern	
Ireland,	and	former	leading	member	of	the	PIRA,	describes	how	he	and	his	friend	
decided	to	initially	join	the	OIRA:	
	
“At	that	stage	my	knowledge	of	who	was	the	IRA	would	have	been	like	everyone	
else’s,	you	would	have	thought	there	was	only	one	IRA…	For	us	we	joined	what	
we	believed	to	be	the	IRA	in	Derry.	Within	a	few	short	weeks	of	being	involved	in	
the	IRA	in	Derry,	as	we	believed,	it	became	clear	to	us	that	the	situation	was	
more	complicated	than	we	initially	thought.”	(Interview	with	Martin	
McGuinness,	June	23rd,	2008)		
	
It	was	only	after	his	initial	experience	that	McGuinness	was	to	come	to	a	more	
concrete	and	lasting	allegiance	decision.	Through	his	analysis	of	the	event,	which	
saw	him	move	from	the	Officials	to	the	Provisionals,	he	does	refer	to	the	strategic	
differences	between	the	two	strands	of	Republicanism.	However,	he	also	places	a	
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significant	emphasis	on	the	levels	of	trust	and	distrust	he	had	in	the	members	of	
both	groups.	It	became	clear	to	him	that	he	was	more	familiar	with	members	of	
the	PIRA,	people	he	trusted	more	than	those	in	the	Officials.	Both	his	trust	and	
distrust	sees	an	overlap	between	functional	and	personal	trust.	
	
“I	suppose	it	was	mostly	being	unimpressed	by	the	people	that	we	met	after	we	
effectively	joined.	We	were	coming	to	the	opinion	that	there	was	a	much	more	
effective,	for	want	of	a	better	word,	approach	to	the	situation	by	what	was	being	
offered	by	the	Provisional	IRA	as	they	were	then	known	after	the	split…In	terms	
of	then	joining	the	Provisional	IRA,	I	was	familiar	with	some	of	the	people	who	
were	associated	with	the	Provisional	IRA.	In	fact	I	realised	that	I	was	probably	
more	familiar	with	some	of	the	people	who	were	in	the	Provisional	IRA	than	I	
was	with	some	of	the	characters	I	met	in	the	Official	Republican	Movement.”	
(Interview	with	Martin	McGuinness,	June	23rd,	2008)		
		
	
The	power	of	the	familiarity	with,	and	subsequent	trust	in,	other	members	is	a	
recurring	theme	among	many	of	the	new	recruits.	This	familiarity	not	only	
allowed	individuals	to	trust	their	future	comrades,	but	it	also	provided	them	
with	an	opportunity	to	join.	For	many	new	recruits,	even	if	they	were	aware	of	
the	differences,	their	choices	were	often	led	by	who	they	knew,	not	what	they	
knew.	
	
“The	Provisionals	seemed	to	me	to	be	the	more	popular.	I	was	basically	walking	
down	the	street	and	I	seen	this	thing	‘Join	the	Provisional	Irish	Republican	
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Army’…I	was	attracted	to	that	for	some	reason.	I	think	it	was	really	because	a	
lot	of	my	friends	were	joining	the	Provisionals.	I	mean	I	didn’t	join	the	
Provisionals,	as	opposed	to	joining	the	Officials	because	of	abstentionism,	or	it	
was	not	as	left	as	the	left	wing.	It	was	nothing	to	do	with	that	kind	of	politics.	It	
was	just	a	popular;	it	was	more	a	popular	group.”	(Interview	with	Joe	Doherty,	
February	1st,	2008)		
		
For	those	young	members	who	sided,	and	stayed	with,	the	Official	IRA	(nine	rank	
and	file	members	and	three	leadership	figures	who	were	interviewed	here)	they	
had	another	allegiance	related	decision	to	make	in	quick	succession	of	their	
original	one	as	their	organisation	split	again	in	1974.	However,	through	their	
experience	in	the	organisation,	even	if	they	had	not	reached	the	level	to	acquire	
first‐hand	knowledge	of	the	leadership	decisions	leading	to	a	split,	they	had	
transposed	their	loyalty	and	trust	in	significant	figures	within	their	local	
leadership.	It	was	this	trust	that	would	assist	their	decisions.	‘Denis’	describes	a	
local	Divis	Street	(a	widely	Republican	street	in	West	Belfast)	meeting	with	a	
local	leader	in	the	aftermath	of	the	1974	divide.	He	initially	describes	the	
importance	of	the	individual	sent	to	deliver	the	message	about	the	split	and	the	
options	he	was	presenting.	This	quote	displays	not	only	the	importance	of	the	
individual	but	also	how	local	rivalries	were	at	the	forefront	of	any	decision‐
making.	
	
“Now	this	guy	I	would	have	known	from	all	my	time	in	the	Republican	
Movement	and	I	would	have	had	an	affinity	with	him,	and	I	trusted	him.	And	
again	that	was	another	thing	there	too,	you	could	have	sent	somebody	down	
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there	who	you	didn’t	like	or…	if	somebody	from	Leeson	St	had	of	come	
over...First	of	all	you	wouldn’t	have	trusted	them,	second	of	all	the	friction	would	
have	made	it	dubious,	and	you	would	have	then	got	a	whack	and	got	a	second	
opinion,	which	could	have	turned	you	either	way.”		(Interview	with	‘Denis’,	
February	29th,	2008)	
	
Over	the	years	this	local	leader	had	gained	such	a	level	of	trust	in	the	group	that	
the	majority	of	that	local	unit	would	have	potentially	followed	him	no	matter	
what	he	recommended.	Due	to	their	youth	and	lack	of	experience	and	knowledge	
they	were	more	reliant	on	trust	than	the	more	experienced	and	mature	members	
were.	
	
“He	was	speaking	to	you	as	a	comrade,	a	friend,	a	soldier,	fellow	volunteer,	and	
somebody	you	would	go	around	the	corner	with.	Everything	he	said	you	could	
relate	to…If	he	had	of	said	[the	options	were	to	go]	Provisional,	Official,	neutral	
and	Bangladeshi.	And	he	had	said	we	are	going	Bangladeshi,	the	chances	are	
you	would	have	gone	with	that	until	you	had	figured	it	out.	You	were	young	you	
were	immature,	you	were	easily	influenced.”	(Interview	with	‘Denis’,	February	
29th,	2008)	
	
	
As	with	the	mafia	organisations	(Campana	and	Varese,	2012)	kinship	and	
community	are	important	factors	within	Irish	Republicanism.	A	significant	
number	of	interviewees	referred	to	the	fact	that	members	of	their	family	or	their	
close	community	were	members	of	the	Republican	Movement	prior	to	their	own	
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membership.	Across	the	generations	this	has	played	a	vital	role	in	a	number	of	
them	joining	up.	
	
“I	grew	up	with	these	people,	I	was	surrounded	by	these	people.	It	was	sort	of	a	
natural	progression	for	me	to	go	on	to	be	a	member	of	the	IRA.	If	there	hadn’t	of	
been	the	Troubles	I	dare	say	I	would	still	have	been	a	member	of	the	IRA.”	
(Interview	with	Richard	O’Rawe,	April	9th,	2008)		
	
For	many	new	recruits	this	provided	them	with	a	higher	degree	of	knowledge	to	
base	their	decisions	on	than	those	recruits	with	no	prior	connections.	They	
would	hear	an	account,	albeit	potentially	biased,	of	the	internal	debates	and	
manoeuvrings	within	the	organisation.	While	this	familial	bond	is	not	the	
equivalent	of	trust	it	did	facilitate	the	development	of	both	trust	and	distrust	in	
others	both	internal	to	and	external	from	the	family.	It	allowed	potential	recruits	
to	closely	observe	actions	and	decision‐making	and	from	that	form	an	opinion	on	
who	they	could	trust,	and	for	that	matter	who	they	could	distrust.	One	such	
member	was	the	late	Dolours	Price	who	alongside	her	sister	Marian	and	others	
was	responsible	for	the	Old	Bailey	bombing	in	London	in	1973.	The	Price	sisters	
came	from	a	well‐known	Republican	family	in	west	Belfast.	Throughout	their	
youth	they	became	accustomed	to	both	leading	and	rank	and	file	Republicans	
staying	in	or	visiting	their	house.	On	one	such	occasion	when	the	violence	of	the	
summer	of	1969	was	engulfing	west	Belfast	Dolours	Price	was	to	find	leading	
members	of	the	IRA,	members	who	would	go	on	to	form	the	Official	IRA,	in	her	
home.	She	describes	how	her	growing	distrust	in	them	and	their	potential	for	
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defence	was	to	play	a	significant	role	in	her	future	allegiance	choice,	even	if	she	
did	not	necessarily	disagree	with	the	Officials	politics.		
	
“There	sitting	in	our	front	room	was	Billy	McMillen,	Bobby	McKnight	and	not	
one	of	the	Sullivans,	another	Sticky	(member	of	the	OIRA),	three	of	them	sitting	
in	our	front	living	room.	I	remember,	I	was	only	a	young	girl,	I	remember	saying	
‘do	you	not	know	what’s	going	on	out	there?	People	are	getting	killed.	Who	is	
protecting	us?’	They	were	actually	sitting	waiting	for	their	lift	across	the	
border…That	is	when	I	became	a	Provo	(member	of	the	PIRA),	nothing	to	do	
with	their	policy,	their	ideals,	not	to	do	with	the	fact	that	I	wasn’t	a	Socialist,	not	
to	do	with	the	fact	that	I	thought	that	Stickies	were	all	Communists,	not	to	do	
with	anything	like	that,	just	to	do	with	disgust	at	their	conduct	and	how	they	
behaved	and…My	father	when	they	went,	I	remember	him	saying	‘Sure	they	sold	
all	the	guns	to	the	Free	Welsh,	they	gave	all	the	guns	away	that	crowd.	They	
don’t	want	to	fight.’	That	was	my	initiation	in	to	the	Movement.”	(Interview	with	
Dolours	Price,	April	21st,	2008)		
	
For	each	of	these	new	recruits,	irrespective	of	their	degree	of	prior	knowledge	of	
the	groups	personal	trust	was	superseding	abstract	trust	when	it	came	to	their	
allegiance	decision‐making.	Theirs	were	not	decisions	based	on	the	trust	in	
abstract	concepts	or	ideologies.	They	were	basing	their	allegiance	on	their	trust	
in,	or	distrust	of,	others.	
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1.4.2 The Appreciation of Trust by the Leadership 
The	power	of	trust	and	distrust	is	not	just	something	observed	when	looking	at	
new	recruits	and	the	broad	membership.	If	a	leader	does	not	have	enough	trust	
from	the	membership,	they	will	undoubtedly	fail,	no	matter	what	their	policy.	
For	the	member	to	join	one	side	over	the	other	they	must	have	some	degree	of	
trust	in	those	they	are	joining.	For	the	leadership	to	succeed	they	need	to	
guarantee	the	trust	of	their	membership	before	making	any	significant	strategic	
or	tactical	changes.	Therefore	we	must	assess	how	the	leadership	aim	to	
guarantee	the	trust	of	their	membership	in	order	to	come	out	as	the	dominant	
force	in	the	aftermath	of	a	split,	or	even	avoid	a	split	altogether.	For	them	they	
must	consider	all	levels	and	forms	of	experience	within	the	organisation	if	they	
are	to	succeed	in	their	goals.	Therefore	the	assessment	of	trust	must	not	just	
focus	on	those	who	trust,	but	also	those	who	need	to	be	trusted.		
	
Throughout	each	of	the	splits	analysed	there	are	insightful	descriptions	given	by	
the	leadership	that	ascertains	the	importance	they	placed	in	gaining	trust,	as	well	
as	the	tactics	they	utilised	in	achieving	this.	This	is	best	exemplified	in	the	1986	
division	that	saw	the	formation	of	the	CIRA.	In	the	aftermath	of	this	split,	and	the	
removal	of	the	abstentionist	policy	(a	policy	where	candidates	refused	to	take	
their	electoral	seats)	to	Dail	Eireann	(the	Irish	parliament),	the	Provisionals	
secured	the	support	of	approximately	90%	of	the	pre‐split	membership.	If	one	
was	to	analyse	Republicanism	purely	in	relation	to	policies	and	traditions	this	
would	have	come	as	a	surprise,	as	abstentionism	was	one	of	the	cornerstones	
and	identifiers	of	what	it	was	to	be	a	Republican.	However,	by	analysing	the	
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leadership	strategies	and	preparation	for	the	change,	on	both	sides	of	the	divide,	
the	result	was	to	be	expected.		
	
All	of	the	leadership	figures	interviewed	on	both	sides	of	the	split	acknowledged	
the	importance	of	a	variety	of	factors	relating	to	the	preparation	for	change.	
Central	to	this,	in	relation	to	trust	was	the	importance	of	the	high	profile	
supporters	utilised	by	the	Provisional	leadership	of	Gerry	Adams	and	Martin	
McGuinness.	They	displayed	the	awareness	that	affiliation	decisions	are	not	only	
made	in	relation	to	the	strategies	and	policies,	they	are	often	made	in	reaction	to	
who	is	advocating	not	what	is	being	advocated.	At	times	this	influential	
individual	can	be	a	local	rather	than	national	leadership	figure.	Therefore	the	
leadership	utilised	a	number	of	high	profile	advocates	in	the	lead‐up	to	and	
during	the	vote	that	ultimately	brought	about	the	split.	Some	of	the	most	
powerful	of	these	came	from	the	old‐guard	membership	who	could	provide	
continuity	with	past	Republican	campaigns,	the	continuity	that	the	CIRA	still	
attempt	to	claim.	As	any	constitutional	change,	such	as	the	dropping	of	
abstentionism,	required	a	two‐thirds	majority	to	pass	it	was	not	only	a	factor	of	
retaining	membership	numbers	post‐split	the	organisation	required	votes	at	
both	the	Army	Convention	and	Ard	Fheis	(political	party	convention)	in	order	for	
the	motion	to	pass.	They	therefore	needed	influential	members	to	‘deliver’	votes.	
Francie	Mackey	the	president	of	32CSM,	believed	to	be	the	political‐wing	of	the	
Real	IRA,	describes	how	and	why	this	happened.	
	
“If	you	have	senior	membership	who	were	in	the	IRA	saying	that	this	leadership	
is	100%	solid	who	on	the	ground	was	going	to	question	that?...	At	key	stages	in	
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all	of	this	key	people	in	local	areas	and	at	a	regional	area	were	wheeled	out	to	
say	that	this	was	100%	sound.	If	a	key	person	known	in	the	locality	to	be	in	the	
IRA,	if	that	person	says	that	something	was	right	well	then	it	was	taken	as	
right.”	(Interview	with	Francie	Mackey,	June	25th,	2008)		
	
The	utilisation	of	a	trustworthy	old‐guard	member	was	exemplified	in	the	case	of	
the	PIRA	member	John	Joe	McGirl	from	Leitrim	in	the	northwest	of	Ireland,	an	
influential	figure	whose	importance	was	cited	across	both	sides	of	the	divide.	
The	influence	of	McGirl	is	described	here	by	Sean	O’Bradaigh,	a	leading	member	
of	Republican	Sinn	Fein.		
	
“They	would	never	have	got	that	through	the	Ard	Fheis	without	McGirl,	because	
McGirl	delivered,	I	can’t	remember,	but	McGirl	delivered	something	like	27	or	30	
votes	to	them	at	the	Ard	Fheis,	with	all	the	cumann	(local	branch)	in	Co.	Leitrim.	
I	mean	that	was	major,	it	was	a	terrible	disappointment	to	us	of	course.”	
(Interview	with	Sean	O’Bradaigh,	August	17th,	2008)		
	
Securing	the	support	of	these	influential	individuals	played	a	crucial	role	across	
each	of	the	splits.	The	reliance	on	the	support	of	one	individual,	and	the	
subsequent	support	from	others	which	they	could	deliver,	is	also	demonstrated	
in	the	case	of	Brian	Keenan	and	the	1997	split	with	the	RIRA.	In	the	lead	up	to	
the	split	it	appeared	that	Keenan,	a	member	of	the	PIRA	Army	Council,	was	
siding	with	the	dissenters	against	Adams	and	McGuinness.	Throughout	his	years	
as	a	paramilitary	strategist	Keenan	had	gained	the	trust	of	some	of	theleading	
and	most	influential	members	of	the	PIRA.	It	is	therefore	speculated	that	if	the	
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leadership	had	not	secured	his	support	then	their	tenure,	and	the	entire	peace	
process,	may	have	discontinued.	Not	only	would	Keenan	have	been	able	to	
deliver	people	who	trusted	him,	but	those	people	were	highly	influential	in	their	
own	right	and	in	turn	would	also	be	able	to	deliver	those	who	in	turn	trusted	
them	and	their	judgement.	It	once	again	indicates	the	power	of	personal	trust.	
	
“If	Kennan	goes	that	was	straight‐forward.	That	was	South	Armagh	[siding	with	
him].	Absolutely	fucking	crucial.	Belfast	what	would	have	happened	there?	You	
can	take	individuals.	[Bobby]	Storey,	[Brian]	Gillen,	[Martin]Ferris,	
[Thomas]Slab	[Murphy],	[Brendan]	Hughes	all	of	them.	Ah	you’re	[Adams	and	
McGuinness]	gone	then.	Things	have	moved	away	then.	Now	you’re	in	serious	
shit.	It	was	key.”	(Interview	with	Sean	O’Callaghan,	March	19th,	2013)	
	
These	examples	should	not	be	interpreted	as	stating	that	individual	members	did	
not	trust	Adams	and	McGuinness.	On	the	contrary	both	of	them	garner	
significant	levels	of	trust	within	Irish	Republicanism.	What	it	does	illustrate	
however	is	the	fact	that	within	an	expansive	membership	a	variety	of	individuals	
are	both	trusted	and	followed.		
1.4.3 Trust in the Media 
It	is	not	just	the	individuals	who	are	trusted;	their	media	has	also	gained	trust	
across	the	years.	This	has	most	notably	included	the	organisations’	mouthpieces	
the	Republican	newspapers.		In	the	1970s	for	many	Republicans	their	first	port	
of	call	for	their	internal	news	and	analysis	about	the	movement	was	either	the	
southern‐based	An	Phoblacht	or	the	northern	Republican	News.	With	tensions	
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building	across	the	Republican	leadership	dividing	lines	were	being	drawn	
between	the	old‐guard	southern	leadership	of	O’Bradaigh	and	O’Conail	and	their	
internal	adversaries,	‘the	young	Turks’,	led	by	Adams,	McGuinness,	Danny	
Morrison	and	others.	The	northern	leadership	was	gradually	bringing	about	
changes	in	the	movement,	one	step	at	a	time.	They	restructured	the	PIRA	into	a	
Northern	and	Southern	Command,	and	in	the	mid	to	late	1970s	they	were	
beginning	to	reopen	the	debate	about	the	politicisation	of	the	movement,	the	
debate	that	ultimately	led	to	the	split	of	1986.		
	
It	is	accepted	by	each	of	the	key	leadership	figures	interviewed	that	one	of	the	
crucial	turning	points	in	this	debate	was	the	merger	of	the	two	newspapers	in	
1979	to	form	the	all‐Ireland	publication	An	Phoblacht/Republican	News.	This	was	
not	just	a	merger	of	two	papers;	this	was	the	Adams	leadership	ousting	the	
influence	of	their	leadership	rivals.	In	doing	so	it	enabled	them	to	both	promote	
their	beliefs,	while	simultaneously	silencing	those	of	their	internal	opponents.	
The	importance	of	this	was	not	lost	on	Danny	Morrison,	who	ultimately	took	
over	the	editorship	of	the	newly	merged	paper.	It	allowed	them	to	prepare	the	
ground	for	their	intended	change,	while	simultaneously	stifling	their	opponents.	
	
“I	felt	that	Dave	[O’Conail]	and	Ruairi	[O’Bradaigh]	(future	leaders	of	
Republican	Sinn	Fein	and	the	Continuity	IRA)	felt	that	they	were	now	going	to	
get	their	hands	on	An	Phoblacht,	which	would	have	been	to	reflect	their	picture	
of	the	world,	and	instead	at	that	meeting	I	announced	that	the	two	papers	were	
being	united	immediately	and	I	would	be	the	editor	because	I	was	National	
Director	of	Publicity.	So	they	lost	that	influence	as	well.	My	point	being	is	that	
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therefore	prior	to	1986	debates	were	also	carried	out	in	An	Phoblacht,	in	
preparation	for	the	ground,	we	were	chipping	away	and	the	argument	for	
continued	abstentionism	in	the	Twenty‐Six	Counties.	So	you	had	a	debate	going	
on	inside	the	IRA,	you	had	an	An	Phoblacht	debate,	you	had	a	Sinn	Fein	debate	
over	a	period	of	years	prior	to	’86.”	(Interview	with	Danny	Morrison,		January	
21st,	2008)		
		
In	the	aftermath	of	any	split	both	sides	are	competing	for	support.	In	doing	so	
they	are	trying	to	promote	their	interpretation	of	events	and	rationale	for	the	
split	to	their	potential	membership	and	support.	In	1986	the	most	efficient	way	
to	do	this	was	through	the	newspaper.	Forming	a	new	movement	the	dissidents	
were	aware	of	this	and	placed	the	development	of	their	paper,	Saoirse,	at	the	
forefront	of	their	agenda.	
	
“We	had	been	through	it	before,	reorganise,	get	an	organising	committee	there	
elected,	link	up	the	various	cumann	across	the	country,	get	a	newspaper	out,	go	
on	with	the	usual,	get	a	premises	for	head	office.”	(Interview	with	Ruairi	
O’Bradaigh,	February	20th,	2008)		
	
However,	it	was	not	enough	to	have	a	paper.	What	they	needed	was	a	paper	that	
people	trusted.	This	is	something	that	their	Provisional	rivals	had	that	they	did	
not.	According	to	Anthony	McIntyre,	a	former	PIRA	member,	it	was	in	the	
aftermath	of	this	split	that	the	merger	of	the	paper	displayed	new	relevance.	
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“Well	I	think	it	was	an	influential	factor	in	that	it	brought	Republicans	a	place	
for	central	ideas,	but	it	killed	off	any	attempt	for	another	party	paper.	Saoirse	
[the	Republican	Sinn	Fein	paper]	had	no	tradition;	it	started	as	a	new	paper.	
With	no	tradition	who	would	read	it?	People	often	buy	papers	out	of	loyalty.”	
(Interview	with	Anthony	McIntyre,	March	8th,	2008)			
	
With	no	tradition	the	new	paper	was	slow	to	gain	trust.	In	essence	the	1979	
merger	was	giving	the	leadership	control	of	the	trusted	medium	for	their	
message	and	interpretation	of	events	at	both	a	political	and	paramilitary	level.	In	
contrast	their	opposition	had	to	start	developing	this	trust	from	scratch,	a	trust	
they	have	never	been	able	to	fully	regain.	With	these	newspapers	being	the	first	
port	of	call	for	the	majority	of	members	to	gain	access	to	political	and	
paramilitary	statements	and	interpretations	of	events	this	proved	to	be	critical	in	
the	affirmation	of	the	Adams/McGuinness	leadership.	This	would	be	the	
equivalent	of	one	side	of	a	feuding	Al	Qaeda	leadership	having	full	control	of	
Inspire	magazine,	or	a	trusted	website.	
1.4.4 Dissident Distrust 
Throughout	the	Troubles	and	into	the	peace	process	Gerry	Adams	and	Martin	
McGuinness	garnered	significant	levels	of	personal	trust	across	the	movement.	
They	have	utilised	this	trust	bringing	about	some	of	the	most	significant	and	
dramatic	changes	in	republicanism	from	the	dropping	of	abstentionism	to	the	
comprehensive	decommissioning	of	the	PIRA,	from	power‐sharing	with	their	
erstwhile	adversaries	in	the	Democratic	Unionist	Party	(DUP)	to	the	support	for	
the	Police	Service	of	Northern	Ireland	(PSNI).	Each	of	these	changes	has	been	
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historic	and	has	fundamentally	changed	what	it	means	to	be	a	Provisional	
Republican.	While	there	have	been	splits	along	the	way	the	most	striking	aspect	
of	this	is	that	these	splits	have	not	been	more	significant	and	that	the	emerging	
dissidents	have	not	been	stronger.	
	
In	the	minds	of	those	dissidents	one	of	the	key	reasons	for	this	is	the	extreme	
trust	the	membership	has	in	Gerry	Adams,	a	trust	that	in	the	dissidents’	
interpretation	leaves	the	Provisional	population	devoid	of	any	critical	analysis.	
For	those	dissidents	the	utility	of	this	trust	is	portrayed	in	a	negative	manner.	It	
is	their	belief	that	the	leadership,	and	especially	Adams,	manipulated	this	trust	
and	led	the	movement	away	from	their	core	values.	They	utilise	this	emphasis	on	
trust	to	portray	Adams	as	an	individual	who	has	sold	out	republicanism,	rather	
than	as	a	leader	of	the	movement.		
	
“They	believed	in	him	[Adams].	They	put	their	trust	and	their	belief	in	a	man	
who	walked	all	over	them,	who	used	that	belief	and	that	trust	to	go	in	the	
direction	he	wanted	to	go,	irrespective	of	the	Republican	Movement,	a	united	
Ireland.”	(Interview	with	Geraldine	Taylor,	January	23rd,	2009)	
	
This	perceived	manipulation	of	trust,	and	sell‐out	of	republicanism,	has	
permeated	into	the	everyday	existence	among	some	of	the	more	senior	
dissidents.	It	has	led	to	considerable	internal	paranoia,	and	distrust	of	comrades,	
a	distrust	that	could	prove	to	be	debilitating	to	any	advancement	they	wish	to	
achieve.	This	permeating	paranoia	is	reflected	in	the	following	quote	from	‘Alex’	
a	founding	member	of	the	PIRA	and	a	supporter	of	the	CIRA.	
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“The	Brits	got	such	a	grip	on	the	Provisionals	God	knows	what	way	the	
dissidents	as	they	call	them	are	set	up.	They	are	bound	to	have	people	involved	
there	[who	are	informing],	it	is	common	sense.	My	attitude	would	be	you	
wouldn’t	know	who	the	hell	you	are	talking	to	or	who	to	trust.”	(Interview	with	
‘Alex’,	January	23rd,	2009)			
	
While	inherent	trust	can	lead	to	evolution,	a	pervading	distrust	can	destabilise	
any	desired	progress.	With	the	emergence	of	a	newly	formed	‘IRA’	(a	dissident	
merger	of	RIRA,	Republican	Action	Against	Drugs	and	other	previously	
unaffiliated	dissident	republicans)	the	question	of	trust	must	once	again	be	
addressed.	For	the	merger	to	succeed	there	needs	to	be	trust	within	both	the	
leadership	and	the	rank	and	file	membership.	Without	it	there	is	always	the	
potential	for	paranoia,	infighting	and	even	violent	feuds.	These	are	groups	and	
individuals	who	have	been	rivals	over	a	number	of	years.	With	this	rivalry	will	
have	come	significant	levels	of	distrust.	Only	time	will	tell	whether	this	distrust	
permeates	into	the	new	group.	From	developing	a	new	leadership	structure,	and	
choosing	those	individuals	to	take	on	the	roles,	to	carrying	out	attacks	the	
internal	trust	within	the	organisation	will	be	tested	throughout	the	
organisational	evolution.	It	is,	as	yet,	unclear	if	and	how	these	issues	have	been	
dealt	with	or	resolved.	However,	it	is	a	research	topic	that	needs	to	be	returned	
to	in	the	future.		
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1.5	Discussion	
In	1987	Louis	H.	Bluhm	posited	that	trust	is	but	a	‘secondary	concept’	on	the	
edge	of	our	analytical	endeavours.	This	was	true	in	1987,	and	is	still	largely	true	
today.	Within	terrorism	research	the	analysis	of	trust	is	barely	even	a	secondary	
concept.		It	is	somewhat	second	nature	to	assume	the	primacy	of	ideological	
influences	in	terrorist	decision‐making,	especially	in	relation	to	organisational	
affiliation.	While	ideology	may	play	a	primary	role	for	some	members	it	is	both	
irresponsible	and	dangerous	to	assume	the	dominant	role	of	ideology	at	the	very	
naissance	of	their	involvement	with	the	group,	or	at	any	other	stage	of	their	
involvement	for	that	matter.	Presuming	its	presence	fails	to	acknowledge	the	
complex	heterogeneity	of	both	terrorist	involvement	and	engagement.	The	
present	analysis	has	demonstrated	that	within	Irish	Republicanism	the	influence	
of	trust	was	most	powerful	for	those	new	recruits,	even	superseding	ideology,	in	
relation	to	organisational	affiliation.	In	light	of	this	we	must	constantly	look	at	
the	more	holistic	picture	of	what	it	means	to	engage	and	become	involved	with	a	
terrorist	group,	and	not	just	focus	on	one	aspect	of	what	it	means	to	be	part	of	a	
terrorist	group.	
	
It	is	important	that	if	we	are	to	advance	our	understanding	of	trust	in	terrorism	
that	it	is	necessary	for	us	to	expand	our	analysis	across	groups	and	across	time.	
We	need	to	assess	what	role	it	plays	across	different	stages	of	an	individual	
terrorist’s	‘career’	and	across	different	roles	within	the	organisation.	The	two	
key	factors	of	kinship	and	utility	of	violence	dominate	much	of	the	trust	and	
crime	literature,	with	kinship	demonstrably	important	within	the	present	
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analysis	as	well.	However,	there	are	numerous	other	aspects	of	trust	pertinent	to	
both	terrorism	and	non‐political	criminality.	One	would	suspect	trust	and	
distrust	to	be	central	at	all	levels	of	terrorist	decision‐making,	part	of	the	
everyday	life	within	the	organisation.	Due	to	the	(semi‐)	clandestine	nature	of	
the	groups	they	would	be	constantly	suspicious	of	those	around	them.	They	have	
to	assess	and	reassess	whether	their	comrades	are	informers	supplying	
information	elsewhere,	either	externally	or	internally	within	the	group.	If	this	is	
coupled	with	the	constant	threat	of	organisational	fragmentation	it	in	turn	
provides	for	an	extremely	paranoid	environment.		
	
With	this	intra‐comrade	suspicion	an	ever‐present	threat,	and	even	without	its	
presence,	trust	must	become	a	vital	component	that	binds	and	maintains	an	
organisation.	For	a	terrorist	organisation	to	continue	in	operational	existence	
trust	is	an	imperative.	Along	each	stage	of	the	terrorist	process	trust	is	key	both	
in	violent	and	non‐violent	activity.	Individuals	must	trust	the	group,	its	leaders	
and	members	in	order	to	align	themselves	with	them.	Members	planning	an	
attack	must	trust	their	comrades’	ability	to	complete	the	specific	tasks	they	have	
been	given,	while	also	trusting	them	not	to	divulge	information	about	the	attack	
to	the	authorities.	Leaders	must	have	the	trust	of	their	membership	to	succeed	in	
any	tactical,	strategic	or	ideological	change.	And	in	a	post‐split	environment	
members	need	to	trust	the	individuals	they	are	siding	with	to	achieve	their	
stated	or	intended	goals.		
	
What	is	apparent	from	the	present	research	is	that	personal	trust	has	played	a	
significant	role	in	the	allegiance	decision‐making	of	new	recruits	within	a	
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terrorist	organisation.	If	these	findings	are	replicated	elsewhere,	and	across	the	
trajectory	of	terrorist	group	involvement,	they	may	provide	an	important	insight	
for	anyone	designing	or	implementing	disengagement	or	deradicalisation	
programmes.	While	the	content	of	these	programmes	is	undoubtedly	key	it	may	
not	be	effective	if	a	trusted	individual	does	not	deliver	it.	Those	administering	
the	programmes	must	not	presume	the	dominance	of	a	radical	ideology	in	the	
maintenance	of	organisational	membership.	Instead	they	must	adequately	assess	
the	reality	of	membership,	and	appreciate	the	possibly	that	membership	of	
terrorist	organisations	is	not	necessarily	first	based	on	ideological	grounds	
(Bjorgo	and	Horgan,	2009,	p.4).	This	assessment	must	factor	in	a	number	of	
issues	including,	but	not	exclusively,	organisational	experience,	organisational	
position	and	the	role	of	trust.			
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